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European Community policy for the electronics industry1 emerged in the late 1970's, as the failure of 
national champion policies was becoming widely evident. The symbolic starting point was a set of 
meetings initiated by European Commission Vice President, Viscomte Etienne Davignon, with the 
chief executives of Europe's twelve largest native2 electronics firms. These 'round table' meetings were 
the first serious attempts by the European Commission to establish a close working relationship with 
the European electronics industry. They signified a new departure in policy-making: both a new policy 
bargaining axis, and the genesis of European level efforts at competitive enhancement.  
 
Three main arguments are advanced in this paper. First, the past decade has witnessed a sea-change in 
the nature of the agenda-setting and policy-making processes for the EC electronics sector. EC policy-
making has gone from being an intra-institutional consensus-building process, to a multi-sided 
bargaining process. The role of non-governmental actors in policy formulation and implementation has 
increased significantly since the early 1980's. In particular, large European high technology firms have 
significantly enhanced their policy bargaining position in relation to public sector actors. Firms have 
gone from being 'policy outsiders' to 'policy partners'. In fact, EC policy for electronics substantially 
derives from bargaining between the European Commission and large European electronics firms - the 
firms frequently exerting the most influence over the final policy outcome.  
Second, at a 'sub-pentagonal' level, EC policy results in part from intra-Commission bargaining. 
Ideological cleavages exist as much within the Commission as they do within the Council of Ministers. Thus, policy is in part an outcome of intra-Directorate-General (DG) rivalries, and bargaining between 
those bureaucrats and Commissioners of different ideological persuasions.  
Third, despite the rhetoric and the stated intention to move towards greater liberalisation, policy for 
electronics retains considerable interventionist elements. These are particularly prevalent in trade 
policy issues. The official Commission position on industrial policy advocates a middle-way between 
government-directed firm strategy, and free market competition. However, the policy reality often 
resembles a 'protective partnership', i.e. selective, firm requested government intervention. Although 
verbally shunning sectoral policies, the Commission has identified certain industries as 'strategic', and 
apportioned them special policy treatment. The European-based electronics industry has long been in a 
preferential partnership with the EC.  
 
2. International State-Firm Bargaining 
 
Although often diametrically opposed, and never identical, public policy and corporate strategy can 
converge at certain times, and in specific circumstances. Peterson (1991) supports this conclusion. He 
cites the Single Market programme as an example of such convergence, arguing that it was launched 
largely because both European governments and industry reached consensus on its desirability3. A 
significant actor which Peterson omits however is the European Commission. We contend that in 
certain cases, such bargaining takes place primarily between firms and EC institutions - national 
governments participating via the EC Council of Ministers. The concept of 'bargaining' is taken here as 
meaning the process whereby "an agreement or contract establishes what each party will give, receive, 
or perform in a transaction between them"4.  
 
Strange & Stopford (1991) and Tucker (1991) argue that contemporary industry-specific policy is 
shaped through a process of government-firm bargaining. Thus, in effect, the entire nature of 
international economic relations has changed fundamentally, as the negotiating power of firms within 
the international arena, has increased significantly. As Strange (1992) puts it: 
 
governments must now bargain not only with other governments, but also with firms and enterprises, 
while firms now bargain with governments and with one another5. 
 
Hence, not only has the nature of government-industry relations changed, but as Strange & Stopford 
(1991) conclude, the entire nature of international diplomacy has been transformed as "industrial 
policies and economic management" replace conventional military-based foreign policies, as the chief 
form of inter-state competition6. These authors develop the notion of a 'Triangular Diplomacy' within 
international policy bargaining. They argue that within the contemporary international political 
economy, the notion of 'diplomacy' must be expanded to include power bargaining with and between 
transnational corporations. Thus, states must now bargain both with each other and with global firms; 
whilst global firms also bargain with each other [Stopford & Strange 1991: 19-23].  
Our 'Pentagonal Diplomacy' notion attempts to expand the Stopford & Strange model in specific 
applications. That is to say, when applied to the unique institutional structure of the European 
Community - which is an international setting, given that it consists of fifteen nation states - an extra 
dimension must be added to the bargaining process. In analysing, within an EC context, how firms and 
governments relate to and negotiate with one another over defined mutual goals, one must include 
another player or level of "governance"7 within the paradigm, i.e. the European Commission. Thus, 
two other "angles" must be included, to transform Stopford & Strange's triangle into a pentagon8. 
Governments must thus negotiate not only with other governments and with firms, but also with the 
Commission; and firms must bargain with other firms, governments, and with the European 
Commission. Hence, what emerges is more along the lines of 'pentagonal diplomacy', rather than 
triangular diplomacy [Diagram 1]. Such a five-sided bargaining structure is complex, because the 
interplay varies according to the specificities of a particular bargain. In effect, the pentagonal 
diplomacy concept is a framework for analysing and explaining how industrial policy develops within 
the European Community. It entails five interlinked sets of negotiating bargains: state-state, firm-firm, 
state-firm, firm-European Commission, and European Commission-state. All five bargaining sets come 
into play for each industry. However, the policy impact of the individual sets varies according to the 
industry. Thus, for some industries, the firm-Commission interplay is negligible for instance; whilst for others, it may be the state-state bargain which has little input into policy development. The intention is 
to determine which bargaining set(s) dominate a particular policy-making process; which of the public 
and private sector players involved in the policy sphere actually define and drive a given policy.  
Government-Commission bargaining (which is usually an intra-institutional procedure, between the 
Commission and the Council) can be a rigorous ordeal, or it may merely constitute a Council "rubber 
stamping" of a particular policy. Similarly, Firm-Commission negotiating can be central to the 
development of a particular policy, or it may be peripheral, if not irrelevant, to the policy process. 
Competencies within the EC still vary, and firms can thus end up bargaining either with governments, 
with the European Commission, or with both. 
This state-firm bargaining concept is further supported by Dunning (1993), who argues that the entire 
nature of government-firm (or more precisely, multinational enterprise) relations has changed during 
the last three decades from one based largely on conflict, to one based primarily on cooperation. He 
gives the reason for this change as mainly due to states coming to view multinational corporations as 
engines for national competitive advantage enhancement9. Thus, a bargaining situation develops on 
policy issues, within which the multinational enterprise has an equal, and sometimes dominant, 
position [Dunning 1993; Blomstrom & Lipsey 1993; Stopford & Strange 1991].  
 
3. The Liberal Policy Mask 
 
The European Commission argues that it has moved away from policies of sectoral preference and 
industrial intervention. The more recent policy statements emphasise a new commitment to creating a 
'suitable business environment' for all industries, and the establishment of a 'promotional partnership' 
between the EC and corporations, in order to enhance European firms' competitive advantage in the 
global market. Let us take a closer look at EC electronics policy this decade, and decide if the EC is 
indeed beginning to throw off the shackles of strategic targeting and interventionist electronics policy 
instruments. 
 
A significant development in EC policy for high technology was the 1990 decision to clearly define 
and establish an EC industrial policy. As usual, this decision involved a proposal from the Commission, 
which was subsequently adopted by the Council. The official Commission communications 
surrounding the introduction of a de jure industrial policy were of a purposefully ambiguous nature. 
Constant stress was put on the concept of 'competitiveness' and on the notion that the attainment of 
competitiveness is primarily the responsibility of enterprises. However, the role of governmental actors 
is far from weak in this process, and is more of an active 'partner' than a silent spectator:  
 
The main question is no longer whether an industrial policy is opportune, since governments are 
increasingly aware that, in advanced economies, they have a major influence on industrial 
development and performance. The main issue, in the eyes of the Commission, is which conditions 
need to be present in order to strengthen the allocation of resources by market forces and thereby to 
accelerate structural adjustment, improve industrial competitiveness, and establish an industrial and in 
particular, technological, long-term framework (CEC 1990a). 
 
The main policy document outlining this new and enhanced Community role in electronics policy, was 
the 1990 Industrial Policy In An Open and Competitive Environment report. Internal Commission 
sources10 argue that this document is indicative of the more liberal tendencies within the Commission. 
It is seen as a victory for liberalism over interventionism. The document's initial argument is that a 
growing consensus has emerged on 'the type of policy needed to lay down the conditions for a strong 
and competitive industry' [CEC 1990b: 1]. This consensus derives from the experience of Community 
policies operational since the mid-1980's. The implicit argument is that it has been recognised within 
the Commission that the top-down and heavily interventionist policies of the 1980's have not 
succeeded in enhancing competitiveness; and thus, a new post-interventionist policy set, with emphasis 
on global competitiveness, is needed. The communique goes on to state that the 'role of public 
authorities is above all a catalyst and pathbreaker for innovation. The main responsibility for industrial 
competitiveness must lie with firms themselves, but they should be able to expect from public 
authorities clear and predictable conditions for their activities'. There is nothing new in this argument. To say that the ultimate onus for competitiveness is on firms 
themselves, is to blandly state the obvious. To say that this firm responsibility should be extensively 
supported by the public sector, is to focus on the real issue. The Commission acknowledges that firms 
compete for world market share but it argues that they cannot do so alone. Thus, a middle-way is 
advocated, between government directed firm strategy and free market competition. The result is the 
'protective partnership' model. Of course, those formulating such policy at a Commission or firm level 
would admit to the 'partnership' notion, but would prefer to, incorrectly, describe it as 'partnership for 
competitiveness', lacking in all protectionist elements11. Ross (1993) lends support to the thesis that 
EC industrial policy has been shaped by a Commission-large firm partnership. This applies in 
particular to policy for the electronics sector. During his time spent as an observer within the cabinet of 
Commission President Delors, Ross observed that EC policies for electronics have emerged during the 
1990's as a result of large European electronics firms exerting pressure on the Commission to assist 
them:  
 
Jacques Delors was frequently visited by the captains and generals of European industry. A select 
group of them thus alerted him in spring of 1990 to the clouds gathering around European electronics 
(Ross 1993). 
 
They exerted pressure through employing the economic argument, that, due to the strategic nature of 
electronics, if the European electronics industry was in difficulty, the wider European economy would 
also be adversely affected. In addition, said industrial leaders played the political card, intimating that 
the Community's raison d'etre may be questioned amongst the European business community, if the 
Commission did not attempt to assist industry in times of stiff international competition:  
 
Delors's corporate visitors proposed expensive bail-outs and protectionism and intimated, sotto voce, 
that if the companies sank deeper into trouble the Community might be held responsible, with dire 
consequences for business confidence in the Commission's efforts (Ross 1993). 
 
Not only did the Commission fear losing the confidence of European business (and thus losing power 
vis-a-vis national governments) but as several observers have argued12, the Commission saw 
European industry - especially high technology sectors - as potential allies in the struggle to achieve a 
federal Europe. The Commission endeavoured to create a common area of action for European 
industrial affairs and electronics was at the forefront of this undertaking. Moreover, the Commission 
purposefully "courted" big business, seeing them as important allies in the European integration 
process. As Flamm (1990) argues:  
 
the EC seems embarked on a path toward technological integration of the Community13. 
 
This objective - involving declining use of national R&D programmes and a much larger role for the 
European Commission in organising and administering national R&D initiatives - fits with that 
pursued tangentially for European semiconductor trade and investment [Flamm 1990: 284]. Flamm's 
arguments lend support to our assertion that EC policy for electronics is part of the Community's 
efforts to create a common area of control and action for industrial affairs. The success or failure of 
these efforts has important lessons for the practicality of European integration. 
 
Let us illustrate the notion of a 'protective partnership' with some policy reality. Several examples of 
policy instrument implementation may be advanced to support a partnership interpretation of EC 
policy. The most notable realms of EC intervention are R&D initiatives and trade.  
 
4. R&D As An Instrument of the 'Protective Partnership' Model 
 
R&D activities emerge as the EC's dominant policy tool for electronics. Official Commission figure 
show that in 1993, for instance, the Community spent, in total, over 2 billion ECU (roughly $2.4 
billion) on research. This sum hovered around $2 billion per annum for some years before. Much of 
this sum goes to projects within the Commission directed Framework programme. According to a 
former EC Commission Vice-President, Karl Heinz Narjes, the Community has a responsibility to 'strengthen the scientific and technological basis of European industry', in addition to actively 
encouraging industry to become more responsive to the global competitive environment [Narjes 1988: 
396]. Thus, it is obvious that at the most senior levels of EC policy-making during the 1980's, an active 
interventionist view was taken towards the competitive enhancement of European high technology 
industries such as electronics. In addition, this policy stance had a protective, 'big brother' undertone, 
which implied that the Commission knew best how to tackle the competitive malaise affecting sectors 
such as electronics. Market reality indicates that this was not actually the case. As the US Office of 
Technology Assessment has argued, EC intervention and subsidisation through R&D has had little 
success in enhancing the international competitiveness of firms within policy targeted sectors [OTA 
1991]. Numerous European policy-makers and electronics corporate executives14 argue that an 
interventionist EC regime will eventually lead to increased competitiveness for European electronics 
firms. For instance, Alain Gomez of Thomson advances the argument that European electronics firms 
simply need an 'adjustment period', under EC protection, and with government financial assistance, 
from which they will eventually emerge as strong global competitors [Fortune 20 April 1992: 159]. 
The influence of Gomez and other leading pro-intervention electronics executives is implicit in EC 
policy practices. However, as numerous academic commentators [Porter 1990; Stopford 1993] have 
argued, and as countries such as Japan and the United States have illustrated, successful national 
industries tend to be ones where intensely competitive domestic rivalries push each other to excel. By 
agreeing to deals that limit competition in its own electronics industry, the EC deprives these firms of 
their incentive to innovate. 
In the aftermath of the 1991 Maastricht agreement, the Commission proposed to assess and redirect its 
R&D policy. The main stated reason for this change in policy was the realisation that although a strong 
technological base existed in Europe, serious problems existed in, firstly, attempting to convert said 
knowledge into marketable products, and secondly, transferring these inventions into market shares 
and profits. These twin weaknesses were acknowledged to be particularly worrisome in leading edge 
electronics sectors such as semiconductors15. Thus, the change in policy primarily entailed a move 
closer to market for Community R&D activities, and the encouragement of better ways for industry to 
quickly and effectively exploit the results of such activities. This new policy had three elements: 
redirecting research activities, increasing resources, and strengthening the programmes. On the first of 
these, the Commission introduced the notion of "priority technology projects more directly linked to 
key generic technologies on which the competitiveness of European industry depends"16. Many of 
these "priority technologies" were in the electronics sector, eg. semiconductors.  
The post-Maastricht R&D policy involved an increased proportion of the Community budget devoted 
to research. In absolute terms, per annum, this was to be an increase from Ecu 2.4 billion in 1992 to 
Ecu 4.2 billion in 199717. For Framework III (1990-94), ESPRIT received Ecu 1 billion 352 million, 
from a total budget of Ecu 5.7 billion [Buigues & Sapir 1993: 28]. This represents almost 25 per cent 
of the total EC R&D budget being spent on information technologies. In addition, about Ecu 3.1 billion 
remained unspent after Framework II, and this sum was transferred to Framework III, bringing the 
total five year budget to Ecu 8.8 billion. This is a Community outlay of roughly Ecu 1.75 billion per 
annum, through the Framework Programme alone18. Within this, microelectronics is top of the list of 
five areas of research [CEC 1992: 5]. For Framework IV (1994-98) the agreed amount of finance for 
information and communication technologies is Ecu 3 billion 384 million, from an overall budget of 
Ecu 12 billion19 [CEC 1994a: 3-4] This sum shows a significant increase in the proportion of the 
Framework budget which is apportioned to ESPRIT; the percentage share for information technology 
has been increased to about 29 per cent.  Such an increase was partly in line with natural increases and 
partly to help fund the priority technology projects. 
The fundamental effect of these changes is to increase the Community's influence on European 
collaborative R&D initiatives.  
 
5. Trade Tools and Protective Partnership 
 
The EC utilises several trade policy tools to protect the electronics sector from full exposure to global 
competition. These include high tariff levels, local content rules, the Procurement Directive, rules of 
origin, and anti-dumping legislation. We will briefly examine how these trade instruments affect the 
ability of one electronics sector - semiconductors - to compete.  In spite of liberal overtones, numerous protectionist element remains in EC trade policy for 
semiconductors. One of the most controversial of these is the 14 per cent tariff which the EC imposes 
on semiconductor imports20. At a 1992 semiconductor production conference in Ireland21, almost all 
of the world's leading chip makers expressed their dissatisfaction with what they described as the EC's 
"unfair and inconsistant" tariff policy. More specifically, the conference delegates highlighted two 
aspects of the overall policy for special criticism. Firstly, the high duty on semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment, and secondly, the varying duties the EC imposes on components22. For 
instance, US chip giant Intel estimates that the 25 per cent EC duty on production equipment added 
$125 million to the cost of a wafer fabrication facility which Intel recently built in Ireland. Intel 
Europe's director and general manager, Hans Geyer, describes the EC tariff system as another 
manifestation of protectionist policies, and states that such policies  
 
make systems manufacturing in Europe more expensive...and by hurting our customers, the EC is 
hurting the industry23. 
 
A related policy is that involving "local content" rules, i.e. that manufactured chips which have less 
than 50 per cent of Community value-added, are subject to tariffs. Most local content requirements in 
the Community are levied by member states, on their own initiative. However, there are EC wide 
requirements with regards to antidumping and preferential trade agreements. Here again, several of the 
leading global chip makers have had conflicts with the Commission (and with indiviidual member 
states) regarding the very high level of local content required in the chips they sell in the EC.  
 
The above policy is closely linked with another controversial and protectionist element of EC trade 
policy - the Procurement Directive agreed by the EC Council of Ministers in February 1990. The main 
thrust of this directive is that contracting bodies may refuse tenders, if 50 per cent or more of the value 
of manufactured products forming part of the tenders is of non-EC origin. A further dimension of this 
directive is that when EC and non-EC tenders are considered equivalent, the former must be 
preferred24. The US has expressed its reservations regarding the 1990 EC Procurement Directive, 
given its discrimination against non-EC manufacturers.  
 
Another interventionist element of EC trade policy affecting semiconductors is "rules of origin" 
legislation. This trade tool is directly associated with local content requirements of course, given that 
local content rules cannot be implemented until the products country of origin has been determined. 
This procedure may sound overly bureaucratic: one might argue that it is a relatively simple task to 
determine where a product originates - in fact many have a "Made In...." tag attached! This is true in 
textiles or in childrens toys for instance; however, it is not such a simple process when applied to 
semiconductors. Active semiconductor components go through a number of complex stages of 
production before they are ready for application. Due to production costs such as labour, the less 
complex but more laborious stages in this process are frequently carried out in countries other than 
those in which the chips were etched on the silicon for instance. This often means that the design and 
processing of chips will occur in a firm's home country, such as the US or Japan; the assembly of said 
microchips will take place in a country where labour costs are low - frequently south-east Asia; and the 
final testing of the chips will be in the country where the export buyers are located, for example, EC 
countries.  
In 1989, Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 289/89 came into force, determining the origin of 
integrated circuits. This regulation (binding in all member states of course), adopted a clear and 
stringent aproach in determining the country of origin for chips. Clear account is taken of the multi-
leveled production process for integrated circuits, and of the fact that this entire process chain usually 
involves two or more countries. Also, most importantly, the Commission takes account of the 
difference in value between stages of production:  
 
Whereas Article 5 of Regulation (EEC) No.802/68 lays down that a product in the production of which 
two or more countries were concerned shall be regarded as originating in the country in which the last 
substantial process or operation that is economically justified was perfomed.......Whereas, for 
integrated circuits, the variety of operations which come within the scope of manufacture makes it 
necessary to establish the last substantial process or operation25  
Thus, the Commission stipulates that the manufacturing operations following diffusion (eg. assembly 
and testing) do not - seperately or collectively - constitute sufficent value-added to warrant "country of 
origin" status being given to the country in which they were conducted. Instead, the regulation 
determines country of origin as that country in which the knowledge-intensive chip creation stage 
occurs, i.e. where the microchip is given all its functional capabilities.  
In effect, this regulation severely limits microchip imports into the Community. It de facto requires 
non-EC chip producers to establish chip fabrication facilities within the Community - if they wish to 
avoid punitive measures on imported products, and enjoy full access to the EC market.  
 
Taken together, import tariffs, rules or origin, the Procurement Directive, and local content 
requirements, are elements of an EC policy for semiconductors which has obvious and rigorous 
protectionist tendencies towards imports. As Tyson (1993) argues: 
 
European rules of origin combined with various local content tests to meet the rules, can determine the 
eligibility of foreign firms for the the following benefits of the unified European market: exemption 
from residual national quotas, eligibility for government procurement, avoidance of antidumping 
duties, and eligibility for [EEA] and other preferential trading arrangements26. 
 
A fifth protectionist trade instrument employed by the EC vis-a-vis electronics, is anti-dumping 
legislation. Anti-dumping is a legal instrument employed by the EC against companies which are 
alleged to be importing products into the Community at below market prices. Between 1987 and 1991 
alone, fourteen anti-dumping investigations were initiated against electronics firms. The companies 
under investigation were mainly Japanese and South Korean [CEC 1992b]. Such East Asian firms 
were not necessarily dumping, but could simply have been producing at lower costs. As Ernst (1993) 
argues, Europeans have cried foul on this practice simply to protect more inefficent European 
producers27. It is difficult to establish the actual production cost of Japanese and Korean microchips. 
Thus, we cannot categorically prove whether or not these East Asian firms were actually dumping. 
To illustrate the increasing role played by antidumping legislation in EC trade policy, one can see that 
between 1987 and 1991, the EC Commission initiated 169 antidumping investigations, involving 
imports from 33 countries. Two leading semiconductor producing countries - Japan and South Korea - 
were at the top of the list in terms of antidumping investigations. The country most involved was Japan, 
with 21 investigated complaints; and South Korea was third, having 19 claims against its firms 
investigated by the Commission28. Of these cases, fourteen concerned the electronics sector. More 
specifically, three were concerning semiconductors - two against Japanese and one against Korean 
producers.  
 
We have advanced evidence to suggest that a protective partnership exists in the nature of EC policy 
for semiconductors. This is evident in both the R&D and trade policy instruments which the 
Community employs. This reality is in conflict with the main thrust of Ostry's innovation policy model 
for industry. The essence of that model is to promote structural change and improve international 
competitiveness [1990: 53]. Our findings indicate that EC policy is actually distorting structural 
change and probably hindering competitiveness. The innovation policy approach does however fit with 
the official stated aim of EC industrial policy for electronics29. Thus, significant changes must occur if 
EC policy reality is to fit the rhetoric.  
 
6. Intra-Commission Rivalries in the Creation of Electronics Policy 
 
Sandholtz (1992) has argued that ESPRIT represented both a major change in European policy-making 
for high technology, and an interesting case of international cooperation. The dismal past record of 
cooperation between governments in high technology sectors, added to the generally perceived 
sensitive, national security associated nature of semiconductors and computers, combined to make 
ESPRIT quite an unusual initiative. It is further argued that, unlike other forms of government-
government-firm-firm collaboration which had occurred in Europe, ESPRIT was unique given that its 
political leader was itself an international governmental actor - the European Commission [Sandholtz 
1992: 2]. Sandholtz in fact argues that, through ESPRIT, the European Commission actually 'seized the initiative', and exercised policy leadership [1992b: 274]. This is a rounded rejection of the realist 
argument that 'international organisations' such as the European Commission, are irrelevant in any 
analysis of international cooperation.  
Peterson (1991) argues that the 1990s have witnessed an increased transparency in the administration 
of EC R&D programmes. Due largely to pressure from the member states, the policy has become more 
exposed to outside assessment - conducted mainly by independent groups of experts (eg. the ESPRIT 
Review Board). This development has seen a greater role (at least formally) for university and private 
research labs within the policy-making process. Thus, they must now be considered in any EC 
bargaining model. Peterson also supports the notion that Commission Directorate-General XIII 
(Telecommunications, Information Market, and Exploitation of Research) has been (and continues to 
be) interventionist. Particularly during the early to mid-1980's, in collusion with the Big 12 
information technology firms, Directorate-General XIII dominated EC collaborative R&D programmes. 
He goes on to argue that this central role of DGXIII has been significantly reduced, as the structure of 
Framework III (with increased emphasis on the role of SMEs etc.) has witnessed more administrative 
power swinging to less interventionist DG's such as DGXII (Science and Research)30.  
Contrary to popular belief, the Commission is not a monolithic entity. As a multinational institution, it 
endeavours to contain several divergent political and economic cultures. The most prominent and 
vigorous intra-Commission schism is the divide between the open market, liberal trade cultures of the 
Community's northern members, and the more protectionist, Colbertist cultures of France and the 
Community's southern countries. This largely bipolar divide is particularly evident in industrial policy-
making. Thus, tensions arise in both the Council of Ministers and the Commission, between those who 
favour a 'minimalist' approach - seeing competition policy as the main tenet of industrial policy - and 
those who prefer a 'maximalist' approach - advocating an active, interventionist industrial policy 
regime [Sharp,1991:177]. A constant struggle rages between individual Commissioners and 
Directorate-Generals, to determine policies for so-called 'core' technology industries. This argument is 
sustained by a number of senior Commission officials31. Ross (1993) argues that Directorate-General 
IV (Competition Policy), is the most liberal Directorate-General, and has consistantly been the most 
opposed to interventionist policies for the European electronics sector, and, indeed, has been opposed 
to the very notion of a 'strategic industry'. It strongly condemned the 1991 'State of Play..' report 
(which was developed within DGXIII). Directorate-General III (Internal Market and Industry) is not as 
vigorously free market, but it does have more market-oriented tendencies than Directorate-General 
XIII, and it did disapprove of the 'State of Play..' communication. It did not like the notion of 'strategic 
industries' either. Directorate-General XIII is the most interventionist DG, and the most collusive with 
big business. It has consistantly supported strategic targeting. [Ross 1993; 1995]. Directorate-General 
XIII is traditionally viewed as a bastion of dirigisme.  
The process has become more complex, as the number of actors that significantly influence the policy 
bargaining procedure has increased. More checks and balances now exist on the Commission, and the 
general policy-making process is more transparent and inclusive. However, this fact does not appear to 
have exposed the weaknesses inherent in this policy, nor altered its broadly interventionist nature. 
Perhaps the late 1993 movement of information technology R&D responsibilities from there to 
Directorate-General III was a symbolic move, intended to illustrate a desire on the part of the 
Commission to finally move in reality towards a more liberal regime for information technology. 
Official Community policy statements indicate that such a power shift has indeed occurred. The policy 
reality does not fit with this alleged development though. Interventionist elements remain powerful 
within the Commission policy-bargaining process, and de facto, continue to determine policy. This 
decade has witnessed the strengthening of Commission liberals, and the attempt to incorporate their 
approach within the Commission agenda for electronics. Thus, more recent policy statements contain a 
much greater liberal flavour than previously. However, the interventionist policy tools implemented 
during the 1980's have not been repealed or superceded. If anything, they are often enforced more 
rigorously than during their ideological prime.  
 
7. The Main Policy Actor for Electronics 
 
Mason (1992) argues that for cars, EC policy-making is a member state-dominated process. Thus, in 
theoretical terms, he comes down on the side of the neo-realists, perceiving the EC as a loose network of inter-state bargains, controlled by national governments. Governments dominate the European 
Commission, and not the other way around, as neo-functionalists might have you believe.  
This work subscribes to a different principle from both the neo-functionalist and neo-realist schools. 
This approach attributes influence to both sources of political authority (EC and national), within the 
policy bargaining process. However, for the electronics industry, the process is dominated by large 
firms. As Green (1993) argues, neither intergovernmentalism nor neo-functionalist theory takes 
account of the firm as an actor within EC policy-making32. Neither is sufficent to analyse recent EC 
policy-making for industry, as neither can adequately explain the increased influence of the firm within 
this process.  
Other academic studies support our emphasis on the central role that firms play within (EC) policy-
making. From their study of European government-industry relationships in both the 
telecommunications and consumer electronics sector, Cawson et.al. found that  
 
even where governments were acting strategically in the promotion of industries and products, 
outcomes were ultimately decided by the strategies of firms [1990: 361]. 
 
Firm bargaining power was particularly strong in situations where governmental actors set 
'performance' objectives, such as the competitive enhancement of the domestic electronics industry. In 
these situations, government is trying to set both the policy means and ends - a situation which gives 
more bargaining power to the corporate actors, without whose specific actions the policy ends could 
not be achieved [Cawson et.al. 1990: 362]. This supports our argument concerning the role of firms in 
EC policy for electronics industries such as semiconductor components. Such policy has specified 
'performance' objectives (competitive enhancement), thus giving semiconductor producers greater 
policy bargaining strength relative to EC governmental agents.  
Similarly, Junne (1992) argues that large firms occupy centre stage in the creation and control of EC 
policy for areas such as trade and the environment. He argues that they influence policy-making both 
through their economic activity, and through their political interventions [1992: 23]. These 
transnational corporations get directly involved in policy development when their interests are at stake, 
or when their cooperation is needed in order to implement specific measures: 
 
Their relationship with the Commission (and national political bodies) implies more than that od the 
normal lobbyists who try to impose their vision on government. Representatives of MNCs are often 
called in by government (or the Commission, for that matter) because of their in-depth knowledge of 
specific affairs which civil servants would lack [Junne 1992: 24]. 
 
As we have already seen, George Ross (1992: 1995) substantiates this argument. As an observer within 
the Delors Cabinet during 1991, he witnessed first-hand the direct and high level relationship which 
existed between the Commission and the European electronics industry. Frequent meetings occurred 
between President Delors and the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of some of Europe's industrial 
giants33. The overall objective for both parties was to halt the competive decline of the indigenous 
European electronics industry. Delors participated in such meetings because he believed in the need for 
a corporate input into industrial policy formulation. He listened even more attentively to the electronics 
firms because of their implicit threats to withdraw their political support for the Community (and thus 
for the integration process) if their views were not adequately accounted for in the policy-making 
process [Ross 1995: 115-6]. 
 
It is evident that a complex set of bargains exist between firms, firms and the Commission, the 
Commission and the member states (usually through the Council of Ministers), member states 
themselves, and states and firms, in order for EC electronics policy to emerge. However, the empirical 
evidence shows that two other, more peripheral actors must now also be accounted for in the 
bargaining process. They are, firstly, the European Parliament; and secondly, non-governmental, non-
corporate members of the scientific community (i.e. from university or private research labs). The 
European Parliament's function in approving EC R&D spending, and its increased willingness to use 
this role to question and delay related policies, means that it must be considered within certain parts of 
the policy-making process. The existance of independent R&D policy assessment panels, and the new 'European Assembly of Science and Technologies'34, indicates that university and private research 
labs also influence policy choices at certain times in the policy-making process. 
Thus, one is faced with the option of expanding the pentagonal diplomacy model to incorporate two 
further actors. However, given the fact that neither of the two players mentioned above have a 
significant impact upon the policy bargaining process, and generally only influence certain parts of the 
policy set (mainly collaborative R&D initiatives), it is not deemed necessary to include them within the 
pentagon. Instead they may be viewed as linked external variables, which influence certain sides of the 
pentagon at particular times. 
 
Thus, in summation, the EC bargaining process which has been outlined comprises five categories of 
actors: firstly, on the Commission side, Directorate-Generals XIII (Telecommunications, Information 
Market and Exploitation of Research), III (Internal Market & Industry), XII (Science & Research), and 
to a slightly lesser extent, I (External Relations)35, and IV (Competition Policy); secondly, on the 
Council of Ministers side, assorted national government departments and COREPER (national 
permanent representatives to the Community); thirdly, the European Parliament, on budgetary issues; 
fourthly, university and private research laboratories; and finally, most of the leading European-based 
electronics firms. 
Of these, the most important actors are Directorate-Generals I, III, IV, and XIII of the EC Commission, 
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One can see that the process has become more complex, as the number of actors that influence the 
policy bargaining procedure has increased. It may be argued that more checks and balances now exist 
on and within the Commission, and the general policy-making process is more transparent and inclusive. However, this fact does not appear to have exposed the weaknesses inherent in this policy, 
nor altered its broadly interventionist nature. 
 
8. Some Policy Consequences 
 
How can one rate the "partnership" between EC governmental actors and industry in creating 
competitive advantage for specific European information technology sectors? More particularly, how 
is EC policy affecting the competitiveness of European electronics producers?  
The 'Porter Diamond'36 was created as a means of conceptualising the interrelated components which 
together comprise a nation's competitive advantage. For Porter (1990), government's role in 
establishing competitive advantage for an industry is to stimulate improvement and innovation 
domestically. He stresses that it is up to the industry alone to actually compete though. Thus, the 
Diamond advances four attributes which shape the domestic competitive environment for corporate 
enterprises, and by extension, enhance or hinder the domestic firms' competitiveness in the global 
market. In brief, they are factor conditions (eg. skilled workforce), demand conditions (eg. sufficent 
domestic economies of scale), related and supporting industries (eg. having a software industry in 
addition to a computer hardware industry), and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry (eg. regulatory 
systems such as EC competition policy)37. These four Porter Diamond attributes comply perfectly 
with the present EC policy approach for semiconductors, and electronics in general. This is actually 
not a surprise. In searching for a more acceptable policy structure, the EC Commission set upon 
Porter's model, correctly seeing it as en vogue amongst large segments of the international business 
and governmental community. One can see Porter's concepts throughout the 1990 Industrial Policy in 
an Open and Competitive Environment Commission report. Indeed, his competitve advantage model is 
mentioned by name in the document. Policies have been implemented for human capital development 
('factor conditions'), sufficent economies of scale, through the Single Market programme ('demand 
conditions'), developing links between enterprises at different stages in the production cycle, and 
encouraging the development of indigenous semiconductor design and equipment manufacturers 
('related and supporting industrues'), and, through competition policy, to regulate corporate structure 
and behaviour ('firm strategy, structure, annd rivalry').  
Thus, if one sees any utility in the Porter model and if it has been applied to the EC policy structure, 
why has competitiveness not improved? 
The answer lies in the important extra-Diamond variable, government. As argued previously, 
government (or governmental actors such as the European Commission) should not attempt to control 
competitive advantage. If it does, the competitive diamond will be distorted. Although unable to 
control competitive advantage, there is no denying the influence which public policy can have on said 
phenomenon [Porter 1990]. Therefore, the argument here is that the overall thrust of EC policy has 
failed to enhance the global competitiveness of the European electronics industry because it has been 
overly interventionist and frequently directed at the wrong areas. Thus, using Porter's model, one can 
argue that the nature and extent of EC policy has upset the balance of the Diamond and adversely 
affected the competitiveness of European electronics producers. We suggest a number of ways in 
which the Community could change its overall policy structure. These include the abolition of trade 
tools such as antidumping, rules of origin, and import tariffs, which merely protect uncompetitive 
European-based firms; the phasing out of large collaborative R&D programmes which are 
administered by the Commission; greater emphasis on funding of basic research within the framework 
of the industry-led Eureka initiative; and more promotional assistance - through training schemes, 
technological diffusion, etc. - for start-ups and young SMEs' within the electronics industry.  
Such changes may reinforce the Diamond and finally permit the creation of a viable domestic 
competitive environment for European producers. After that, it is up to the firms themselves to build 
competitive advantage and capture greater global market share.  
 
9. The Firm-Commission Bargain: A Theoretical Frame 
 
Moravcsik (1994) perceives nation-states and their diplomatic representatives as the most important 
actors within the EC decision-making process. He argues that 'non-governmental organizations rarely 
participate in decisive decisions; where they do, they rarely enjoy decision-making power' [1994:9]. Firms do however (in specific circumstances) play a significant role in the EC decision-making process 
[Sandholtz & Zysman 1989; Cawson et.al. 1990; Green 1993]. One cannot ignore the changed role of 
the firm in the policy process. Large European high technology firms have significantly enhanced their 
policy bargaining position in relation to political actors. The thrust of EC policy for electronics 
industries has derived from bargaining between the European Commission and large European 
electronics firms. National governments (and the European Parliament) have generally only entered the 
process in a consultative way, or to give policy compromises final approval. This firm-Commission 
bargaining partnership has come to the fore since Jacques Delors became Commission President in 
1985 [Green 1993: 35]. In the spirit of French social Catholicism, Delors has always advocated 
dialogue and cooperation between industry and government. The notion of 'policy partnership' may be 
distinguished from mainstream theories of government-business relations such as corporatism, 
pluralism, and private interest government. It is substantively different from pluralist conceptions of 
'lobbying' or 'interest group politics'.  
The essence of 'neo-corporatism', as applied to the EC, is that the future European political economy 
would be kept together through a "web of dense and durable, bi-, tri-, and multilateral bargaining 
relationships, involving public and private bodies alike" [Streek & Schmitter 1992:199]. Streek & 
Schmitter go on to argue that neo-corporatism assumes an underlying social structure which is 
effectively polarized between 'capital' and 'labour' [1992:212]. Sargent (1985) supports the argument 
that this polarization occurs at an EC level. She asserts that the Community institutions have 
endeavoured to develop a 'social partnership' with representatives of labour and capital, and that this is 
indicative of EC level corporatism [1985:229]. This fundamental feature of neocorporatism 
distinguishes it from the policy partnership which we identify within EC-industry relations for 
electronics. The Commission bargains only with capital, only with the management of Europe's large 
electronics firms. Labour does not enter the equation - certainly not at the policy-making level. As such, 
what we are describing for electronics cannot be conceptualised through neocorporatist theory.  
Furthermore, the nature of neocorporatist EC-level policy bargaining differs from that which this work 
describes. Although the European Commission consults with the social partners during the creation 
and implementation of reports and legislation, it does so neither at a high level (Commissioners are 
never directly involved), nor on an equal basis [Sargent 1985:239]. In effect, the neocorporatist 
interpretation of EC-business negotiation places private interest organisations in a subordinate role to 
EC institutional actors. This further distinguishes neocorporatism from the policy partnership notion, in 
that, first, consultation does not take place at the level of Commissioner-CEO; second, these interest 
groups constitute only a part of the Commission's wide consultations on a particular issue(s); and third, 
neocorporatism refers specifically to "organisations" and not to individual firms or a small, 
autonomously grouped, alliance of firms.  
Although relevant to many areas of EC-business relations, 'pluralism' does not entirely encapsulate 
what has been occuring within the electronics sector. Lehmbruch describes pluralism as being 
characterised by  
 
the predominance of 'pressure-group' politics and the lobbying of government agencies and parliament 
by fragmented and competing interest groups, and by a low degree of effective participation by unions 
in policy-making.  
 
Thus, unlike corporatism, there are no interest "blocks" which are sanctioned by government and 
which negotiate on behalf of a business sector. The interests are not "licensed, supported, or controlled 
by the state", nor do they exercise a monopoly within their particular business sector [Schmitter 
1977:9]. It is more like a state of anarchy, with no real rules or central authority. Although one may be 
initially tempted to describe EC relations with the large European electronics producers as pluralist, the 
evidence suggests that the relationship is in fact more complex. Large European-based electroncs firms 
are more than mere lobby interests: they are in fact invited by the European Commission to discuss the 
creation and implementation of EC industrial policy. They negotiate - generally at the level of 
European Commissioner-corporate Chairman - and together forge the policy which is then sent for 
approval to the national governments.  
Thus far, neither neocorporatism nor pluralism seem to account for what has occured vis-a-vis policy 
formulation for EC electronics. In particular, they focus on groups or industry associations, rather than 
on a handful of large firms acting together but autonomously.  A third theory is that of 'private interest government'. In brief, the notion arises as an alternative to 
direct state intervention and regulation. It involves an attempt by government to use the collective self-
interest of social groups as a means for achieving public policy objectives [Streeck & Schmitter 
1985:16]. In effect, Streeck & Schmitter (1985) describe it as an attempt to maximise the overlap 
between the specific interests ('categoric good') of particular groups, such as business lobbies, and the 
broader interests ('collective good') of society. The policy bargaining which occurs between public and 
'private' interest government helps to define this overlap. Inherently, the theory involves a close 
relationship between interest associations and state or Community authorities, and a significant level of 
policy input from the 'private interest government' actors [Streeck & Schmitter 1985:20]. Thus, this 
idea comes closest to conceptualising the Commission-firm interplay for electronics policy. However, 
it denotes a more liberal regime than that which we describe for the European electronics industry. 
Being an alternative to state intervention and regulation, the theory implies that government policy is 
constructed entirely in accordance with free-market principles. Also, the private interest government 
literature does not adequately account for EC policy bargaining relationships, concentrating instead on 
the national level.  
Thus, what we are describing cannot be adequately conceptualised through any of the existing theories 
or literature. The theory of private interest government does help to describe the creation and control of 
EC electronics policy but it does not account sufficently for the interventionist tendencies of the 
European Commission or for the collusive nature of the policy. Therefore, we advance the 'policy 




The Community has continually argued that its role is largely that of a 'competitive facilitator', i.e. the 
instigator of structural adjustments and the catalyst of innovation. Competitive enhancement per se, is 
the job of firms themselves. This is a very thin dividing line between realms of responsibility. For 
instance, as the changing structure of the Community Framework R&D programme has shown, it is 
increasingly difficult to delineate between Commission and corporate sponsored Community-wide 
research projects. Furthermore, consider the overall expanse of EC policy for the electronics sector: 
elaborate and expensive R&D support structures; competition rules which police corporate structure 
and practice; a wide array of policies aimed at assisting firms to comply with international 
environmental standards, to adapt to new production and management techniques, to have a well 
trained and flexible manpower pool at their disposal; trade tools which serve to restrict the impact of 
global competition on Community-based firms.The Commission is in all areas of activity which affect 
the competitiveness of European electronics producers. Furthermore, it is there with the support of a 
majority of all other actors in the paradigm - national governments, the European Parliament, 
universities, private research laboratories, and firms.  
It may be argued that there is nothing unusual or unprecedented about this fact, particularly when 
viewed in a global context. Relations between the public and private sectors have long been close and 
consensual in Japan and Korea for instance. In the United States, there are many cases of government-
firm negotiated intervention, eg. the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agreement. Interestingly though, in 
relation to semiconductors, such partnerships do not appear to have adversely affected corporate 
competitiveness in these third countries.  
The widely espoused 'liberal approach' which the Community is supposed to have adopted since the 
early 1990's, has not come to fruition. Intervention - manifest through everything from product 
development activities to managed trade - persists, and shows no sign of abating. The main 
transformation has simply been a large-scale shift in policy initiation annd control from the national to 
the Community level. In applying the principle of subsidiarity to electronics, one finds that most 
governments and firms have decided that activities are best consumated and conducted at a 
Community level. 
 
The other important change in policy has been the nature of the agenda setting and policy-making 
processes. EC policy-making has gone from being an intra-institutional consensus-building procedure, 
to a multi-sided bargaining process. The role of non-governmental actors, particularly firms, has 
increased significantly since the beginning of the 1980's, and now frequently has an equal say in the 
formulation and implementation of policy. As Peterson (1991) argues:  
Taken together, [the Framework Programme and Eureka] have provided industry with a significant and 
unprecedented role in decision-making about the goals, organization, and funding priorities of 
European collaborative R&D38. 
 
In effect, a Community-firm policy partnership has developed for the electronics industry, coinciding 
with and overshadowing (although not completely replacing) the incestuous nationally based 
government-firm relationships of the 1960's and 1970's. This new partnership is even evident in the 
Framework programme, the former bastion of public sector driven policy for industry. Sandholtz (1992) 
lends support to the notion that ESPRIT developed from a firm-Commmission bargaining process:  
 
With the help of company representatives, the Commission drafted a proposal for ESPRIT, including 
the strategic rationale and specific objectives in the work programme. In this sense the 
Commission/industry alliance was moving ahead of governments39. 
 
Moreover, Sandholtz's findings reveal that the individual large electronics firms involved in the 
ESPRIT negotiations, played a vital role in convincing their respective national governments to accept 
the European collaborative programme [1992: 310]. Thus, their influence on the policy bargain was 
evident at both the national and the European level of government, displaying these firms' preeminent 
power position as both policy shaper and governmental mediator.  
 
Another policy creation dimension has emerged in this work. At a 'sub-pentagonal' level, EC policy 
results in part from intra-Commission bargaining. Ideological cleavages exist as much within the 
Commission as they do within the Council of Ministers. Thus, policy is in part an outcome of intra-
Directorate-General (DG) rivalries, and bargaining between those bureaucrats and Commissioners of 
different ideological persuasions. These differences have had a significant impact upon the creation of 
electronics policy. More generally, intra-Commission rivalries effect the nature of EC industrial policy. 
This notion that ideological conflicts between different departments of a single governmental actor 
partially shape policy, is not especially new. As Wilks & Wright argue, the notion of intra 
governmental and intra-bureaucracy policy disputes is a recurrent theme in research findings [1987: 
288]. Non-Community examples of governmental fragmentation include that of the acrimonious 
dispute between the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Investment and Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, over the sponsorship and regulation of Nippon Telephone & Telegraph; and the 
fierce rivalry in the United States between the federal departments of defence and justice (to name only 
the main protagonists), for control of telecommunications policy [Wilks & Wright 1987: 288]. Thus, to 
argue that differences of opinion within the European Commission bureaucracy must be considered 
when analysing the EC policy-making process, does not set a theoretical precedent. Evidence from 
studies of the policy-making process of other governmental structures suggests that such intra-
institutional clashes are quite common. 
 
It is difficult - if not impossible - to establish the impact which a policy has on a firm. This is 
particularly true for R&D policies. The counterfactual proves insurmountable in any assessment of 
"competitive enhancement" resulting from R&D policy. Similarly, it is difficult to gauge the precise 
effect of trade tools on corporate market performance. Whilst not being able to assign definitive 
"success" or "failure" labels to EC policy tools, electronics policy has not had the desired effect on 
industry. This may mean that policy has had no obvious impact, either positively or negatively; or it 
may mean that a policy has distorted market forces in a way which can hinder competition.  
As regards the EC 'protective partnership' for the electronics industry, it is suggested that in the 
medium to long term, too much collaboration can become collusive, sustain or create oligopolies, and 
consequently adversely affect competitiveness [Mytelka 1991]. Thus, EC electronics policy has market 
distorting elements. A remedy might be to restrict or abolish trade tools such as antidumping practices, 
rules of origin, local content requirements, and import tariffs, which merely protect uncompetitive 
(former national champion) European-based firms. Further restructuring of collaborative R&D 
initiatives may also contribute to a more competitive European-based electronics industry. 
If one believes the official Commission line, as put forth in the 1990 and 1994 industrial policy 
documents for instance, there is an aspiration towards a purely supportive, 'environment enhancing' role for the Community. In developing the four attributes of the Porter Diamond for building 
competitive advantage, this aspiration is beginning to take shape. However, EC policy does not stop at 
this business environment enhancement role. In directing collaborative R&D initiatives such as 
ESPRIT, and in employing several protectionist trade tools, it goes beyond this liberal, promotional 
mandate.  
 
This paper sheds some light on the neofunctionalist assertion that any shift in policy emphasis from the 
national to the European level deepens economic integration and strengthens European political union. 
Cawson et.al. (1990) argue for instance that  
 
It is possible that the current period is one of transition where national policies are giving away to 
European-level initiatives, and that it is not state intervention itself that is waning but the salience of 
the nation-state level within Europe [1990: 377-8]. 
 
The evidence herein tends to support large parts of this neofunctionalist position. The Commission's 
success in creating a common area of action for information technology affairs, has helped to solidify 
Europe's industrial integration. Moreover, it appears to have translated into greater political unity. This 
is evident in the secondary role of national governments in creating and controling EC policy for 
electronics industries. However, the Commission has achieved this success through a policy 
partnership with large firms. Neofunctionalism fails to account for the role of large firms in EC policy 
bargaining. As a theory, it does not therefore go far enough in explaining the creation and control of 
EC electronics policy. 
A point worth emphasising is that this power shift constitutes more than special interest lobbying for 
certain industries. Instead, it comes much closer to Streeck & Schmitter's (1985) theory of private 
interest government. As the Pentagonal Diplomacy model suggests, for certain industries, EC 
industrial policy is determined jointly by corporate and governmental agents. Large electronics firms 
have gone from being policy outsiders until the late 1970's, to being "policy partners" since the early 
1980's. Their senior executives are consulted by and negotiate with governmental actors on policy 
decisions. Several previous studies support this notion of large firms partly creating EC policy [Junne 
1992; Green 1993]. Ross lends further support to the argument that EC electronics policy has been 
shaped by a Commission-large firm partnership. He reveals that a number of large electronics 
companies have been directly involved in the creation of EC policy for this sector [1995:115-6]. 
'Policy partnerships' differ from lobby interests in that they are formed on the initiative of the 
Commission (Davignon's 1979 roundtable meetings); occur at the highest levels, often between 
Comissioners and CEOs (Delors himself met with the electronics leaders); and, on the non-
governmental side, involve only a handful of international corporations, as opposed to a variety of 
sectoral interest groups or industry associations.  
 
EC policy for the industry did evolve as part of the Community's efforts to create a common area of 
action for industrial affairs. This is evident from the 1979 Davignon 'round table' meetings with 
electronics leaders, through the creation of Framework and ESPRIT and EC involvement in Eureka, 
and culminating in the 1990, 1991 and 1994 EC industrial policy documents, wherein electronics are 
explicitly targeted for "special treatment". Moreover, the shift in policy emphasis away from the 
national and towards the EC level for this industry, established electronics as the Community's 
vanguard high technology industry in the post-SEA drive towards economic integration.  
The increased role of Community institutions in policy for high technology industries such as 
semiconductors had political undertones [OTA 1991; Forum Europe 1992]. In effect, the European 
Commission saw European industry - especially large firms within critical, enabling industries such as 
electronics - as potential allies in the struggle to achieve a federal Europe:  
 
A lot of small, national champions would become a few, big European ones, whose interests would lie 
with the Community, not with seperate states40. 
 
This approach signifies a complete reversal of earlier EC attitudes. As Haas (1958) and Green (1993) 
have argued, during the first thirty years of its existance, the Community viewed big business as "too 
nationalistic", and kept them largely outside of EC policy decisions41. The post-1970's idea may have been that that European industrial interests could be integrated through first, coordinating policy for a 
few large firms within key technology industries. These sectoral common areas of interest would in 
turn "spill over" to other industries. Neofunctionalist theory states that the logical next step would be a 
consolidation of wider economic integration, due to industrial unity; and this would subsequently 
enhance political union. Therefore, the creation of a policy partnership with large, critical technology 
firms, would serve to foster European industrial integration, and at the same time, gradually undermine 
the position of the nation state as a policy actor. Ross's arguments supported this neofunctionalist 
interpretation of EC strategy from the Davignon-industry meetings onwards. He states that President 
Delors devoted considerable attention to the leaders of Europe's main electronics firms because of their 
implicit threats to withdraw their political suport for the Community (and thus for the integration 
process) if their views were not adequately accounted for in the policy-making process [Ross 
1995:115-6]. Neofunctionalism may therefore serve to partially explain the reasons why the European 
Commission desired to set in motion the kind of dynamic resulting in policy partnerships with the 
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